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Rochester soon; yes, maybe even Rochester) are not erased, and erased for good.

The world is watching us. The world overwhelmingly wants us to approve the test ban treaty, and the free world wants to believe in us, because if the rest of the world cannot respect us and believe in us as a democracy which lives what it preaches, our signatures on treaties are not worth much in their eyes, and in turn, their signatures on treaties will not help us, either.

We have freedom, democracy, and human dignity to sell to the world. Let us sell them with clean hands, and if we sell these precious commodities in large-enough quantities, we will prevail over darkness even without test ban treaties, and the bombs themselves, will turn to dust, someday, not humanity.

SECRET PAY BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO VIETNAMESE TROOPS

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the Record an article entitled "CIA Allegedly Pays Nhu's Troops Despite Leader's Disfavor Here," published in the Washington Post this morning.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

CIA ALLEGEDLY PAYS NHU'S TROOPS DESPITE LEADER'S DISFAVOR HERE

The crack Vietnamese special forces troops who stormed Saigon's Buddhist pagodas August 21 are still being paid secretly by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency which trained them for other purposes, highly reliable sources said yesterday.

The sources said their commander, tough, police-trained Col. Le Quang Tung, who is now considered the most powerful military official in South Vietnam under President Ngo Dinh Diem's family, receives \$3 million annually from secret CIA funds for salaries and upkeep of his 2,000 troops.

Last Tuesday, Tung received his regular monthly payment of approximately \$250,000 from the CIA in Saigon on schedule despite publicly announced U.S. anger over the wholesale arrest of Buddhists and other dissident elements in which Tung's troops figured prominently, the informants said.

The sources said there was bitter opposition from most CIA men in South Vietnam to continuing the monthly payments to Tung under the secret agreement in effect between the Agency and the South Vietnamese Government for a year and a half.

They said the CIA men in Saigon, according to information reaching here, pointed out that Tung's special forces units were created, trained, and armed by the CIA a year and a half ago for work with mountain tribesmen and clandestine operations into North Vietnam.

VIEW FROM THE FIELD

The sources said these men feel the Vietnamese Government has now, for its own ends, reversed the original purpose of these units.

These CIA men in Vietnam wanted to see the payments to Tung cut off as a show of disapproval for the Government's crackdown on Buddhists and other dissident elements.

They also hoped the United States would take this opportunity, the sources here said, to demonstrate to Diem and family that the United States will not tolerate in the future such misuse of American funds and equipment.

The sources said that during a CIA staff meeting in Saigon last Monday, all the members present but one strongly opposed continuing the payments to Tung.

The sources said that most of the CIA staff men left the meeting Monday with the impression that the payments would be cut off.

But at the meeting there last Tuesday, the CIA staff was informed that, apparently on orders from Washington, the CIA was doing "business as usual" with Tung and the payment went through on schedule.

EXTRAORDINARY PROGRAM

The sources said that creation and support of Tung's forces was never a part of the normal U.S. military assistance program in South Vietnam, but was totally a CIA undertaking.

The forces were armed with CIA funds, and given the best training in jungle fighting and guerrilla operations available, under CIA supervision, by officers of the U.S. Special Forces.

Some of the squads also were specially trained in assassination and sabotage, the sources said.

Tung himself, besides being commander of the special forces, is also chief of the Vietnamese presidential survey office, which is the top palace security service, and chief of the military committee which advises Diem's powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, on secret military matters.

The special forces have never been placed under control of the regular Vietnamese armed forces, although the Vietnamese Government publicly claims that they are, the sources said.

Tung's six battalions of special forces have consequently seen little combat, although some of them have been used constantly as personal bodyguards for Diem and members of his family.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the article relates to special Vietnamese troops who stormed the Buddhist pagodas in Saigon on August 21 and who are still being paid secretly by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, which trained them for other purposes. The article states, in part:

The sources said there was bitter opposition from most CIA men in South Vietnam to continuing the monthly payments to Tung under the secret agreement in effect between the Agency and the South Vietnamese Government for a year and a half.

The article continues by saying that although CIA men in South Vietnam apparently are opposed to such support, it is being continued by orders from Washington.

For a number of weeks I have been speaking against the foreign aid bill. I made one major speech on South Vietnam, and I have referred to the subject several times since. Only last week I reiterated my view as one who opposed the United States going into South Vietnam, in the first place, and said that we should get out.

I take note of a statement Mrs. Nhu is reported to have made in Europe in the past few days. We all know of the great political power she wields in South Vietnam. We also know that she and her husband, who is a brother of the President of South Vietnam, are vehemently anti-American. She is reported by the press to have said in Europe in recent days, in effect, that the United States does not dare to withdraw foreign aid to South Vietnam. I favor taking up that dare. I favor the United States getting out of South Vietnam. I favor the stopping of our aid to South Vietnam until that dictatorship, that tyrannical regime, is changed, so that it will at

least stand for the principles we profess to support around the world, that is, the principles of freedom, which seek to protect the dignity of man.

It is shocking that we are giving support to a regime so dictatorial and tyrannical as the Diem regime in South Vietnam. I consider such support to be a misuse of the American taxpayers' dollars. We should announce again and again that so long as tyranny exists in South Vietnam, there will be no more support of that country by the United States.

When the foreign aid bill is before the Senate, I shall offer an amendment that will specifically propose to withhold any further aid to South Vietnam. Then let Senators stand up and be counted.

PREPARATION OF STOCKPILING REPORTS

Mr. CASE. Mr. President, the Nation's stockpile program is a keystone of our national defense. It is too important to the welfare of the American people to be used as a whipping boy for partisan politics or for press discussion of purported excerpts of the draft subcommittee report. The public's right to know about how this program has been handled demands that an objective study go to great lengths to avoid partisan political tone.

In making legislative recommendations about the future of this program, I believe we should have the views of the people—Democrats and Republicans—who over the years have had the responsibility for carrying out this program. Subcommittee consideration should not be limited to a partial examination of the handling of a few metals during the period of the previous administration. When the subcommittee report refers to such officials, simple fairness, as well as the public interest in a accurate and complete report, requires that they should have a chance to see the proposed report and make their comments to the subcommittee before final action is taken.

Furthermore, any sound appraisal of past policies requires at least knowledge of the goals established in comparable areas by the present administration.

I became a member of the subcommittee in April of this year, filling a post left vacant by the departure of Senator Prescott Bush from the Senate in January of this year. He, in turn, filled a seat which had been held by the late Senator Francis Case, who died in 1962. I was not a member of the subcommittee during any part of its hearings on the stockpile program, the last of which was held on January 30 of this year.

Shortly after I became a member of the subcommittee, a draft report, marked "secret," was presented to the members of the subcommittee by the chairman. This draft was the work principally of the assistant majority counsel. He was a member of the White House staff at the time of his appointment to the subcommittee staff, and is now back on the White House staff. The minority has had no counsel or other

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